by Denyse O鈥橪eary
We really do not know much about people who lived before the age of writing, but sometimes they surprise us. Consider Gobekli Tepe in Southeastern Anatolia, Turkey, discovered in 1994. Dated at 11,500 years ago, it seems to have been a massive worship site. No one apparently lived at the site (no evidence of cooking or refuse), so it seems to have been set apart in some way.听 tells us,
鈥淚t consists of about 20 stone wall circles (only a few of which have been excavated). Two megaliths face each other in the middle of each ring鈥� The rings are also surrounded by huge, T-shaped stone pillars, some adorned with carvings of dangerous animals. The tallest pillars are about 16 feet and probably weigh seven to ten tons.鈥� (November/December, 2008)
As science writer听Charles C. Mann听explained in听National Geographic,听鈥淕obekli Tepe was like finding that someone had built a 747 in a basement with an X-Acto knife.鈥� The find suggests to many that religion, rather than agriculture, built civilization. We do not know what the builders believed or why, or why they were willing to to do so much to uphold the faith.
Gobekli Tepe declined and was abandoned before the dawn of symbolic communications so we will probably never know. But it seems as good a place as any to begin a discussion of God consciousness in the human brain.
Well first, what is听consciousness? Unfortunately, we must be prepared for grave disappointment when we look at the current fully naturalist science literature. Two schools of thought, twin poles really, dominate the generally accepted naturalist听(nature is all there is) account. One holds that consciousness is part of the material structure of the universe (otherwise, it could not exist). The other school holds that consciousness is merely an illusion generated by the activities of neurons, an illusion conserved by evolution because it enables humans to survive more frequently and pass on their genes. The contention between the two schools is famously called the 鈥溙齩f consciousness.鈥�
We may count zoologist Alex Pomeroy among the first group, the materialists: Consciousness is real听and听it is physical. He听听at RealClearScience (where he is editor-in-chief) that physicists now 鈥済o hunting for consciousness,鈥� hoping to find regions of the brain that constitute its seat.
Christof Koch, president and chief scientific officer of the Allen Institute for Brain Science in Seattle, recently put forward the view, sponsored by neuroscientist and psychiatrist Giulio Tononi, that consciousness resides in听听in the universe:
鈥淭he new theory implies a radical disconnect between intelligence and consciousness, Koch said.鈥� That makes a lot of sense because consciousness isn鈥檛 principally about intelligence anyway, even though some intelligence would seem to be necessary for it to function.
Cosmologist Max Tegmark proposed a few years ago a state of matter,听听as a physical entity for consciousness. This year, Stephen Battersby听听in听New Scientist听that information is 鈥渁 physical thing.鈥�
Information, which consciousness apprehends and sorts, is听not听a physical thing. As evolutionary biologist G. C. Williams (1926鈥�2010)听
鈥淚nformation doesn鈥檛 have mass or charge or length in millimeters. Likewise, matter doesn鈥檛 have bytes. You can鈥檛 measure so much gold in so many bytes. It doesn鈥檛 have redundancy, or fidelity, or any of the other descriptors we apply to information. This dearth of shared descriptors makes matter and information two separate domains of existence, which have to be discussed separately, in their own terms.鈥�
If two entities share so few descriptors, they are probably not similar, let alone the same thing.
And what about those people most of whose brains are missing, who are nonetheless conscious? An unexpected result of fMRI imaging is that we now know unambiguously of a number of such cases, for example:
One French patient’s skull 鈥渨as filled largely by fluid, leaving just a thin perimeter of听.鈥澨鼿e was married and father of two children. His IQ was considered low but he was gainfully employed. Cognitive scientist Axel Cleeremans听
鈥淎 theory of consciousness that depends on 鈥榮pecific neuroanatomical features鈥� (the physical make-up of the brain) would have trouble explaining such cases.鈥�
Another man became听听in an accident but made a remarkable recovery. Then there was the normal 88-year-old man whose brain听听(corpus callosum) between the two halves.
If a naturalist theory of the brain were valid, fMRI should have supported it strongly and pointed us in useful research directions. Despite this awkwardness, philosopher David Chalmers听听at a recent symposium at The New York Academy of Sciences. 鈥淭he scientific and philosophical consensus is that there is no nonphysical soul or ego, or at least no evidence for that.鈥� It鈥檚 odd then that so many听听have believed that consciousness is immaterial.
Our physical brains certainly act on our minds but the reverse is also true. One of the most powerful effects in medicine is the placebo effect: People start to get better when they believe that they are getting better. For example,听听has been found to be as effective as antidepressants in treating serious depression.
But what about the other popular approach, that consciousness is merely a user illusion,听? Just how or why the trick would develop (let alone who the user is) is not clear. No wonder, because the existentially futile debate takes place among entities whose own consciousness is an illusion.
A prominent recent听听for the illusory view is psychologist and novelist Michael Graziano who proposes to solve the conundrum via evolutionary theory. His Attention Schema Theory (AST) posits that
鈥溾�� consciousness arises as a solution to one of the most fundamental problems facing any nervous system: Too much information constantly flows in to be fully processed. The brain evolved increasingly sophisticated mechanisms for deeply processing a few select signals at the expense of others, and in the AST, consciousness is the ultimate result of that evolutionary sequence. If the theory is right鈥攁nd that has yet to be determined鈥攖hen consciousness evolved gradually over the past half billion years and is present in a range of vertebrate species.鈥澨�.
Graziano听听that consciousness is actually a hard problem: 鈥淚t鈥檚 just the brain describing itself鈥攖o itself.鈥� Also, 鈥淐onsciousness doesn鈥檛 happen. It鈥檚 a mistaken construct.鈥� And, “The human brain insists it has consciousness, with all the phenomenological mystery, because it constructs information to that effect.鈥� He believes that hard science will explain all this but he seems to be undercutting science while appealing to it. According to his more recent Integrated Information Theory, if a system is both rich and highly integrated, consciousness will听, even in a computer. But no one has yet seen it happen.
Medical researcher John Kabat-Zinn at BigThink听听that there is no 鈥淚,鈥� and offers to explain how the brain creates the narratives of our lives. According to physicist Enzo Tagliazucchi, consciousness is a product of听.
鈥溾�� the flow of electricity through our brains is not driven by some sentient force with will or intent. And, in fact, what causes the brain to move between states of consciousness and unconsciousness鈥攖o and from the critical point鈥攔emains unknown.鈥�
All the positions from both perspectives outlined above have two things in common: They are fully naturalist and they shed no light at all. We all experience consciousness most of our lives but there is no theory of it.
Doubts about these twin poles are not recent. Pioneer Canadian neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield (1891鈥�1976), author of听 and Oxford zoologist (later, religion researcher) Alister Hardy (1896鈥�1985), author of听听weighed in, more or less, on the side of some sort of immateriality. They tend to be dismissed today as old and out of touch.
Much more recently, eminent atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel cast doubt on the Darwinian naturalist view in听Mind & Cosmos听(2012). But his position was hardly popular. In Yale computer scientist David Gelernter鈥檚听听鈥淭he intelligentsia was so furious [at him] that it formed a lynch mob.鈥� [1]
Science writer Margaret Wertheim,听听why consciousness is such a hot topic now, notes that Giulio Tononi has described the idea that mere matter could generate mind as a mystery 鈥渟tranger than immaculate conception鈥� an impossibility that defie[s] belief.鈥� () Nonetheless, he and many others appear resolved to believe and act on that admitted impossibility. Given their commitments, they have no choice. And given current research directions, there may never be a good theory of consciousness.
We are conscious when we are the听subjects听of an experience. By definition, the experience of consciousness cannot be objective; objects do not have consciousness. If that鈥檚 the听, the problem is probably a permanent feature of a naturalist research landscape. It becomes impossible to talk about God or consciousness of God if we cannot accept that consciousness is an actual but immaterial entity.
Assuming God exists, if consciousness is not an illusion, we may be able to apprehend him more deeply than reason and emotion usually allow. That has been the goal of Christian mystics from the beginning, one for which they proved willing to sacrifice much.
Some neuroscience has been done on mystical states but it is dogged by general hostility to researching the area. [2] For example, in 2005 the Dalai Lama was scheduled to speak at a neuroscience and society conference. The invitation should not have been a surprise. He promotes (and funds) the scientific study of consciousness, and has encouraged his monks to serve as research subjects. He has enjoyed friendships with Karl Popper, Carl von Weizs盲cker, and David Bohm.
However, a number of neuroscientists objected to his role because, as one听听鈥淣euroscience more than other disciplines is the science at the interface between modern philosophy and science. No opportunity should be given to anybody to use neuroscience for supporting transcendent views of the world.鈥� A petition听听the proposed address as 鈥渓ittle more than mumbo-jumbo鈥� was organized by neuroscientists who were not ashamed to be vigorously ignorant of the subject.
The Lama did speak at the conference, but that hardly ended controversy. As we have seen, many neuroscientists assume that a naturalist view of consciousness, however uninformative, is 鈥渟cience鈥� and that a non-naturalist view, however well grounded, is 鈥渘ot science.鈥� One recent development, however, is that听neural states associated with mystical consciousness can now be researched using instruments such as fMRI imaging.
Contemplative Christian nuns have been willing to assist neuroscience. One researcher, Andrew Newberg, found from his studies of Franciscan nuns, using SPECT (single photon emission computed tomography),
鈥溾�� the mind remembers mystical experience with the same degree of clarity and sense of reality that it bestows upon memories of 鈥渞eal鈥� past events. The same cannot be said of hallucinations, delusions, or dreams. We believe this sense of realness strongly suggests that the accounts of the mystics are not indications of minds in disarray, but are the proper, predictable neurological result of a stable, coherent mind willing itself toward a higher spiritual plane.鈥� [3]
In Chapter 8 of听The Spiritual Brain听(2007), neuroscientist Mario Beauregard and I recounted his and doctoral student Vincent Paquette鈥檚 Templeton-funded study [4] of contemplative Carmelite nuns in Montreal, using fMRI and QEEG (quantitative EEG), with Hood鈥檚 Mysticism Scale as an evaluation tool. [5] 听They wanted to study whether specific brain states are associated with mystical contemplation, in particular with mystical union听(unio mystica), a state in which the contemplative Christian feels completely united to God. Such states typically result in greater compassion and healthier attitudes and behavior (also a common result of near-death experiences). [6]
The 15 Quebec nuns, aged 23 to 64 (mean age 50), had collectively spent about 210,000 hours in prayer. If prayer and contemplation register in the brain, they should demonstrate it. It was suggested by media sources at the time that the nuns were merely having an intense emotional experience鈥攁s听The Economist听put it, 鈥渇aking it.鈥� [10]
Beauregard responded,
鈥淎ctually, we would not find that particular accusation hard to rebut at all. A person who is 鈥渇aking it鈥� should generate a lot of beta waves (typical of strenuous conscious activity) and not many theta waves (typical of deep meditative states).鈥�
Mystical experiences cannot be summoned at will. The demand for them is mental noise that must cease. However, an experience we recall or relive tends to run through the same brain regions and pathways as when we first experienced it. Beauregard had already studied this effect in professional actors, for whom it is a performance technique. The actor sobbing over his dead stage father achieves authenticity by recalling a loved one鈥檚 death.
Beauregard and Paquette asked the nuns to recall and relive, with their eyes closed, the most intense mystical experience ever felt in their lives as members of the Carmelite Order. Among their findings were the fact that many brain regions, not just the temporal lobes, are involved in mystical experiences. That finding contradicts the numerous popular science claims for a God spot, module, or circuit in the brain or a dominant role for the temporal lobes. [7]
A more significant finding was that听听were prominent during the fully conscious recollection of deep mystical states, despite the fact that theta waves are usually associated with sleep. Thus, when the nuns said that they were experiencing an altered state of consciousness, they really were.
Do these and other such findings prove that mystics contact a power outside themselves? No, because there is no way to prove or disprove that from one side only. The findings听can, however, rule out many naturalist attempts to account for God consciousness. For example, a complex pattern of experience is not consistent with a simple explanation like a 鈥淕od circuit.鈥�
The neuroscience of the mental states encountered by those who seek God are consistent with contact with a reality. They are not consistent with the pathology or nonsense models commonly used to explain religious experience. [8]
One example of the latter might be Graziano鈥檚听听of awareness of God:
鈥淕od is a social perception. Deities, angels, ghosts, devils, and presences are all consequences of the same machinery in the brain constructing models of conscious minds and attributing them to the spaces around us. People 鈥渒now鈥� these things not because they logically deduce them, but because machinery in the brain constructs the information at a level deeper than cognition, and in a way that doesn鈥檛 easily allow for doubt.鈥� .
The psychology and neuroscience literature is full of such specious claims. Their sheer numbers and the contradictions between them make them hard to even address. For example, debate centers on chimaeras such as whether religion is a听听for the human animal, never over whether it results from a correct intuition about our universe. And there appears to be little compunction about getting听.听For example, a 2007-2008 Baylor University survey found that theological liberals and non-religious people were far more likely to believe in superstitions than other Americans. In other surveys, non-religious people are more likely to see UFOs and religious liberals are more likely to credit astrology than Christians. Christian orthodoxy suppresses superstition, but do not expect to hear that discussed in journals that discuss consciousness, God, or consciousness of God. universe. That would not be 鈥渟cience.鈥� [9]
In the end, there is no need to choose between science and spirituality. But there is certainly a need, as there always has been, to choose between naturalism and spirituality.
About The Author
听is an Ottawa-based author, journalist, and blogger.
NOTES:
[1] Gelernter鈥檚 own听听听on the shifting foci of attention of our consciousness across an inner and outer spectrum of experience.
[2]听See听Note 32, p. 339 of Mario Beauregard and Denyse O鈥橪eary,听The Spiritual Brain: A neuroscientist鈥檚 case for the existence of the soul听(San Francisco: HarperOne, 2007). It recounts a time when Beauregard had received funding but faced opposition on the principle that objective research on religious experiences could not in principle be scientific.
[3] Andrew Newberg, Eugene D鈥橝quili, and Vince Rause,听Why God Won鈥檛 Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief听(New York: Ballantine Books, 2001), p. 113.
[4] Mario Beauregard, Vincent Paquette, Neural correlates of a mystical experience in Carmelite nuns,听Neuroscience Letters听405 (2006) 186鈥�190,
[5] Hood, Ralph W. Jr., Nima Ghorbani, Paul J. Watson, Ahad Framarz, Graham Alecki, Mark N. Bing, H. Kristl Davison, Ronald J. Morris and W. Paul Williamson. 2001. 鈥淒imensions of the Mysticism Scale: Confirming the Three-Factor Structure in the United States and Iran.鈥澨�Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion听40(4):691-705.
[6]听See听The Spiritual Brain, 153-66.]
[7]听See听Chapters 2 through 5 of听The Spiritual Brain听for a survey of popular naturalist theories of this type.
[8] Ibid.
[9]See also:听Chapter 7 of听The Spiritual Brain.]
[10] See http://www.economist.com/node/2478148
[Editor鈥檚 Note: 听Science and Faith image from 2014 Hubble WFC3/UVIS Image of M16, by NASA, ESA, and the Hubble Heritage Team (STScI/AURA), found at听.]